Refinement-based Design of a Group-centric Secure Information Sharing Model

Wanying Zhao and Jianwei Niu and William H. Winsborough

University of Texas at San Antonio
One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, Texas, USA 78249
{wzhao, niu}@cs.utsa.edu, uwinsborough@acm.org


ABSTRACT
This paper presents a formal, state machine-based specification (stateful specification) of a high assurance, secure information-sharing policy. The policy is group-centric; users join and leave groups, objects are added and removed (group operations). Users gain access to objects via membership relationships they have or have had with groups that contain or have contained those objects. The stateful specification given here is a refinement of a prior specification that is given in first-order linear temporal logic (FOTL). The prior FOTL specification defines authorization based solely on event histories, but gives little guidance regarding implementation. The current specification is the result of a second step in a multi-step design process that separates concerns and provides multiple opportunities to detect unintended policy characteristics. We show that our stateful specification is consistent with the prior FOTL specification with respect to the action sequences it permits and the authorization decisions it renders. For verification purposes we use a combination of model-checking and manual techniques.

Keywords
Access Control, Formal Specification, Formal Verification, System Refinement, Secure Information Sharing

1. INTRODUCTION
As a society, we enjoy a great opportunity to make information much more highly available than it has been historically. This can facilitate emergency preparedness by supporting rapid dissemination of information concerning imminent natural or man-made threats or response requirements. Information sharing can also support more general publish/subscribe relationships, as well as enable collaborations that otherwise might require physical proximity. However, all these applications require that some degree of access control (AC) be enforced over shared information. This requirement has sometimes been dubbed, “share, but protect.” Information can be shared between individuals, as with limited access blogs or forums, or between representatives of various kinds of organizations. In the latter case, the metaphor of a secure meeting room may be apt. Participants may be working toward some specific goal, such as designing a new product, arriving at an acquisition or merger agreement, or conducting a joint military operation.

Group-centric secure information sharing (g-SIS) [12] is a recently introduced AC model that brings users and information together in a group to provide for access. It is a simple, yet flexible sharing framework suited for use in highly dynamic environments. The g-SIS framework defines authorizations in terms of action histories involving group operations (namely, user join, user leave, object add, and object remove). Different versions of the group operations interact richly with the temporal order in which those operations occur to determine whether current membership by user and/or object is necessary, or even sufficient, for authorization. One particular g-SIS policy, presented by Krishnan et al., is given by what is called the \( \pi \) specification [13], and is expressed in many-sorted, first-order linear temporal logic (FOTL)\(^1\). It supports two versions of each of the four group operations—one characterized as strict and one, as liberal. (See section 2.)

Using FOTL for the \( \pi \) specification was natural, as authorizations depend heavily on the temporal order in which group operations occur. However, the FOTL specification is highly abstract. It would be difficult for security systems’ stakeholders to comprehend and implement a AC system directly from it. To alleviate users efforts, we develop a separate specification of authorization policy, which is given in terms of attributes and data structures that record appropriate information to enable efficient authorization decisions.

The \( \pi \) specification was the first step in a multi-step design process intended to separate concerns and to avoid distracting the designer with mechanism issues. The current specification is the result of a second step in the multi-step design process that bridges the gap between abstract FOTL specification and enforcement model. The current specification introduces and maintains data structures that summarize

\(^1\)FOTL resembles the more familiar propositional linear temporal logic (PLTL) that is used in model checkers. The differences are analogous to those between many-sorted first-order predicate calculus and propositional logic. Further details are given in section 2.
sufficient information about the history of group operations to enable authorization decisions to be made directly from the data structure values. This in and of itself is a significant step toward generating a specification from which a developer could implement. However, it is not the last. Later steps, not undertaken here, will address distribution, communication, latency issues [11], etc.

The notion of an SM differs from that of a conventional finite state machine only in that the number of (reachable) states is potentially countably infinite. An SM is intuitive and expressive, yet programming-language neutral. We present much of our SM in this paper. To provide a shorthand by which to contrast these two approaches to specification, we call the temporal logic-based specification a stateless specification and a machine-based specification a stateful specification.

Our stateful specification is a refinement of the stateless π specification in the sense that our specification is consistent with the π specification, but provides additional detail. In particular, as mentioned above, it specifies how to maintain data structures that summarize sufficient information about the history of group operations to enable authorization decisions to be made directly from the data structure values. Additionally, our specification adds the aspect of group operation requests, which may be denied. For instance, a user cannot join a group to which he already belongs. By contrast, the stateless specification does not treat requests—only legal actions.

We develop a combination of methodologies to formally verify that a stateless specification and its corresponding stateful specification are consistent (refinement equivalent). We use a model checking tool, NuSMV, to verify if a state machine specification consisting of a single user and a single object within a group satisfies the stateless specification expressed in temporal logic. As the g-SIS system can have unbounded numbers of objects, users, and groups, we develop a manual reasoning technique to generalize automated model checking results to infinite universes.

Defining a stateful specification and showing its refinement equivalence with the stateless specification, as we do here, is certainly not the only means by which a step could be taken toward producing a implemented policy-decision engine. A naïve implementation of the g-SIS system defined by the π specification could maintain the history of group operations and inspect that history each time an authorization decision must be made. However, recording the entire history has the obvious problem that the amount of storage used and the time required to inspect it would grow without bound as the system runs. There are additional techniques that might be used to automatically generate decision engines directly from temporal logic specifications. The alternatives include (1) using general-purpose, automated techniques to construct a Büchi automaton and (2) using “dynamic model checking” [14]. Unfortunately, the automated automaton-generation techniques (option 1) handle only propositional LTL, not FOTL. They also generate an automaton that can be exponential in the size of the input specification. Regarding option 2, it is not entirely clear how to extend that approach to model distributed authorization systems. We emphasize that neither the naïve approach, the automaton-generation approach, nor the dynamic model-checking approach provides multiple opportunities to detect unintended policy characteristics.

Before further discussing the present contribution, let us pause briefly to consider the nature of AC in the context of information sharing. The problem is quite distinct from AC in, for instance, a file system. We are concerned with authorization for information content, not for the container (such as a file) in which that content resides. For this reason, a write operation must be considered as creating a new object, or perhaps a new version of an old object. Extending the π specification to support write through versioning, Krishnan et al. [10] have recently introduced an FOTL specification of such a AC system. It is quite intricate and providing a specification of the sort we present here for it would require far more space than is available. So in this paper, we focus on the original π specification, which supports only read-only access.

Our contributions are as follows. First, we present our stateful specification, which shows how to maintain data structures that summarize sufficient history information to enable authorization decisions to be made directly from the data structure values. Our specification also shows how to handle requests to perform group operations, and how to filter out requests to perform illegal operations. We also provide invariants that relate the values of the data structures in the SM to the histories under which the data structure have those values. These invariants have been verified by using model checking. Second, we show a soundness result, which says that any sequence of group operations accepted by the stateful specification causes the SM to arrive at the same authorization decisions as are arrived at by the π specification. Thirdly, we show a completeness result. Specifically, we show that every sequence of group operations that satisfies the π specification is accepted by our SM. (We already know from soundness that the authorization decisions agree.) We show our technical results through a combination of manual proofs and model checking. Finally, our methodology illustrates for the security community how formal methods techniques can be applied in access control systems. And our verification illustrates for the security community the technical results needed to complete such a verification.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the key elements of the prior g-SIS policy given by the stateless π specification. Section 3 presents our stateful specification of that policy. Section 4 demonstrates that our stateful specification is consistent with the stateless π specification in the sense outlined above. Section 5 discusses how to handle requests to perform group operations that are illegal (such as joining a group to which a user already belongs). Section 6 discusses factors that limit scalability of our design and on-going work seeking to mitigate those factors. Section 7 discusses related work and section 8 presents our conclusions and discusses our future work.

2. BACKGROUND ON G-SIS AND THE π SPECIFICATION

The g-SIS model could be applied to many application which need to “share but protect”. For instance, the collaboration on a specific goal-oriented task (such as designing a new product or merger and acquisition), a shared activity (such as a research group working on a research project), a dynamic coalition (such as a mission-oriented group driven towards completion of a particular task), a subscription ser
vice with publisher disseminating information to subscribers who in turn participate in blogs and forums.

As discussed in the introduction, g-SIS supports four basic group operations—join, leave, add, and remove—and the π specification considers strict and liberal variants of each. Let us summarize the intuition of each of these eight operations. When a user joins a group by Strict Join (SJ), only objects added to the group after join time are accessible. When Liberal Join (Li) is used, the user can additionally access objects added previously by using Liberal Add (LA). When a user leaves a group by Strict Leave (SL), the user loses all access previously granted by membership in the group. When Liberal Leave (LL) is used, the user retains access to those objects granted by his membership immediately prior to leave time. If an object is removed from a group by Strict Remove (SR), all users lose access to it. When Liberal Remove (LR) is used, users who had access to the object at remove time retain access.

2.1 g-SIS Language

As discussed in the introduction, the π specification is expressed in a form of linear temporal logic, specifically many-sorted FOTL. In general, formulas of linear temporal logic (LTL) express requirements on infinite sequences of states, making them particularly useful for specifying the behavior of reactive systems, such as AC systems. PLTL is the simplest LTL. Its formulas are constructed from propositional variables (hereafter “propositions”), logical connectives, and temporal operators. The latter enable formulas to state requirements at different points in the state sequence. (An LTL formula may hold at one point in a state sequence, but not at another.) The temporal operators used in this paper and their intuitive meanings are summarized in Table 1.

FOTL differs from PLTL by incorporating constants, variables, and quantifiers. As a result, the semantics of formulas depends on the actions that are supported. As mentioned above, the π system supports the eight action predicates in \( A = \{ SJ, LJ, SL, LL, SA, LA, SR, LR \} \). Authorization is represented by the authorization predicate, Authz.

Sorts enable us to distinguish users from objects, etc. They resemble very simple types. This is why the π specification uses many-sorted FOTL. For users, objects, and groups, we denote the corresponding sorts by \( U \), \( O \), and \( G \). We also use, respectively, the variables \( u \), \( o \), and \( g \), possibly with subscripts. Sorts are assigned when a variable is quantified: \( \forall u \in U. \phi \).

The semantic values over which a variable ranges depend on the variable’s sort and are drawn from a set that is called the carrier of that sort. For the sorts identified above we denote the corresponding carriers by \( U \), \( O \), and \( G \), respectively. We use the following metavariables to range over individuals: \( u \in U \), \( o \in O \), and \( g \in G \). We denote the collection of carriers by \( C = \{ G, U, O \} \). In general, these carriers may be finite or countably infinite.

We use \( \Omega_C \) to denote the set of finite interpretations of action and authorization predicates over the carriers in \( C \).

An interpretation, \( \iota \), is a function mapping each predicate in the language to a relation over the appropriate carriers. Although they need not be so, the relations in the interpretations we use are finite, reflecting the fact that at any point in time, only a finite number of users, objects and groups have been introduced to the system. In our context an interpretation for \( \pi \) maps predicates to relations of the following types: \( \{ SJ \}, \{ LJ \}, \{ SL \}, \{ LL \} \subseteq U \times G \), \( \{ SA \}, \{ LA \}, \{ SR \}, \{ LR \} \subseteq G \times O \), and \( \{ Authz \} \subseteq U \times O \times G \). Each \( \kappa \in \Omega_C^{\pi} \) is an infinite sequence of interpretations called a trace. For each \( \kappa \in \Omega_C^{\pi} \), we write \( [\kappa] \subseteq U \times G \) to denote the relation associated with SJ by \( \kappa \). If \( \langle u, g \rangle \in [\kappa] \), this means user \( u \) does a Strict Join of group \( g \) at position \( i \). Similarly, \( \langle u, o, g \rangle \in [ Authz ]_\kappa \) indicates that user \( u \) is authorized to read object \( o \) in group \( g \) at position \( i \).

Let us now outline what it means for a trace to satisfy an FOTL formula. Here we illustrate the construction just below by giving the most important semantic rules. To handle variables, we need the notion of an environment \( \eta \), which assigns to each variable an element of the carrier corresponding to the variable’s sort.

The statement that, at index \( i \), \( \kappa \) satisfies \( \phi \) under environment \( \eta \), written \( \kappa, i, \eta \models \phi \), is defined inductively on the structure of \( \phi \). For example, \( \kappa, i, \eta \models SJ( u, g ) \) holds if \( \langle \eta( u ), \eta( g ) \rangle \in [SJ]_\kappa \). For temporal operators, we first define three following requirements that every trace must satisfy at every state. To handle variables, we need the notion of an environment \( \eta \), which assigns to each variable an element of the carrier corresponding to the variable’s sort.

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2.2 The \( \pi \) Specification

The π specification defines three following well formedness requirements that every trace must satisfy at every state.

Requirement \( \tau_0( u, o, g ) \) states that \( o \) cannot be added to and removed from the same group at the same time and that \( u \) cannot join and leave the same group at the same time.

\[ \tau_0( u, o, g ) : \]
\[ \square \neg( ( SA( o, g ) \lor LA( o, g ) ) \land ( SR( o, g ) \lor LR( o, g ) ) ) \land \neg( ( SJ( u, g ) \lor LJ( u, g ) ) \lor ( SL( u, g ) \lor LL( u, g ) ) ) ) \]

Requirement \( \tau_1( u, o, g ) \) says that a user cannot do a strict and liberal join or leave on the same group at the same time and that a user cannot do a strict and liberal joint or leave on the same group at the same time.

\[ \tau_1( u, o, g ) : \]
\[ \neg( SJ( u, g ) \land LJ( u, g ) ) \land \neg( SL( u, g ) \land LL( u, g ) ) \land \neg( SA( o, g ) \land LA( o, g ) ) \land \neg( SR( o, g ) \land LR( o, g ) ) \]

Requirement \( \tau_2( u, o, g ) \) says that a user cannot join a group that he previously joined unless he has since left it, a user cannot leave a group unless he previously joined and has not left since the last joined, an object cannot be added to a group it was previously added to unless it has since been removed, and an object cannot be removed from a group unless it was previously removed and has not been removed since it was last added. Note that Krishnan expressed \( \tau_2 \) as two separate
forms, but that the formulation given here uses \( B \) so as to be more concise.

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau_2(u, o, g) : \quad & \\
\Box ((\text{SJ}(u, g) \land \text{LL}(u, g)) \rightarrow \\
\Box (\neg (\text{SJ}(u, g) \land \text{LL}(u, g))) \land \\
\Box (\text{SL}(u, g) \land \text{LL}(u, g)) \rightarrow \\
\Box (\neg (\text{SL}(u, g) \land \text{LL}(u, g))) \land \\
\Box (\text{SA}(o, g) \land \text{LA}(o, g)) \rightarrow \\
\Box (\neg (\text{SA}(o, g) \land \text{LA}(o, g))) \land \\
\Box (\neg (\text{SR}(o, g) \land \text{LR}(o, g))) \rightarrow \\
\Box (\neg (\text{SR}(o, g) \land \text{LR}(o, g))) \land \\
\Box (\text{SJ}(u, g) \land \text{LL}(u, g)) \land \\
\Box (\neg (\text{SL}(u, g) \land \text{LL}(u, g))) \land \\
\Box (\text{SA}(o, g) \land \text{LA}(o, g)) \land \\
\Box (\text{SR}(o, g) \land \text{LR}(o, g)) \\
\end{align*}
\]

The \( \tau \) specification determines at each point in time whether a user is permitted access to an object via a given group, based on the history of group operations involving the user and object with respect to that group. The \( \tau \) specification is given as follows:

\[
\pi : \forall u : U \exists o : O \forall g : G. \ \\
(\text{Authz}(u, o, g) \leftrightarrow \lambda_1(u, o, g) \lor \lambda_2(u, o, g) ) \land \\
\bigwedge_{0 \leq i \leq 2} \tau_j(u, o, g)
\]

in which \( \lambda_1(u, o, g) \) and \( \lambda_2(u, o, g) \) defined by

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda_1(u, o, g) : \quad & (\neg \text{SL}(u, g) \land \neg \text{SR}(o, g)) \land \\
(\neg \text{LL}(u, g) \land \neg \text{SL}(u, g)) \land (\text{SJ}(u, g) \land \text{LL}(u, g)) \land \\
(\neg \neg \text{SR}(o, g) \land \text{LR}(o, g)) \land \\
(\neg \text{SL}(u, g) \land \neg \text{SL}(u, g)) \land (\text{SA}(o, g) \land \text{LA}(o, g)) \land \\
\end{align*}
\]

The second subformula (involving the \( \tau \)'s) says that traces satisfying the \( \pi \) specification must be well formed. The two subformulas, \( \lambda_1 \) and \( \lambda_2 \) correspond to two cases in which a user is authorized for access to an object. In case (a), handled by \( \lambda_1 \), the user joins the group before or at the same time as the object is added; in case (b), handled by \( \lambda_2 \), the object is added before the user joins. In case (a), authorization does not depend on whether the join and add are strict or liberal because the user is already a member when the object is added. The right-hand subformula of \( \lambda_1 \) (in square brackets) formalizes the requirement that the user is in the group when the object is added. The left-hand subformula permits authorization to continue after liberal leave or liberal remove. Case (b) allows for authorization when both the join and the add are liberal. The right-hand subformula of \( \lambda_2 \) (in square brackets) formalizes the requirement that the object is in the group when the user joins. As it does in \( \lambda_1 \), the left-hand subformula permits authorization to continue after liberal leave or liberal remove. Note that in any trace \( \kappa \) such that \( \kappa \models \tau \), the interpretation of Authz is uniquely determined at each \( \kappa_i \) by the history of interpretations of the action predicates leading up to that point in the trace. In particular, \( u \) is authorized for access to \( o \) via \( g \) at step \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) just in case \( (u, o, g) \in [\text{Authz}]_{\kappa_i} \).

### 3. STATEFUL G-SIS SPECIFICATION

This section begins by introducing the construction of the state machine designed for stateful specification, followed by defining the data structures, and the invariants that identify historical conditions under which each value of each data structure is assumed. We then present the general formula that defines authorization in the stateful g-SIS specification based on the data structure values. We then show the transition relations for each data structure that would maintain the invariants correctly as group operations were performed. To illustrate the stateful specification, we use a case study to show data structure value updates and authorization decisions in the end of this section.

#### 3.1 Our Stateful Specification and its Relationship to the Stateless Specification

Our stateful specification is a deterministic SM that we call \( M^g \), which produces authorization decisions identical to those made by traces that satisfy the \( \pi \) specification. The notion of a state machine we use is standard. It corresponds to the familiar notion of a finite state machine, with the difference being that, depending on the size of the carriers, the state space is not necessarily finite. A state machine is given by \( M = (Q, q^0, \Sigma, \delta) \). \( Q \) is a (possibly infinite) set of machine states \( q^0 \in Q \in \Sigma \) is a distinguished start state, \( \Sigma \) is

\[m^g \]

In section 4 we verify the model with countably infinite carrier by model checking technique and manual proofs.
an alphabet, and $\delta \subset Q \times Q \times \Sigma$ is a deterministic transition relation. Given any sequence $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$, we define the run of $M$ induced by $\sigma$, if it exists, to be the unique sequence $\rho \in Q^*$ of machine states defined inductively as follows. The initial state is $\rho_0 = \delta_0$ and for each $i \in N$, $\delta_\rho(i, \rho_{i+1}, \sigma_i+1)$. (This kind of SM ignores $\delta_\rho$.) If there comes a point in $\sigma$ at which no transition is defined, $\sigma$ is rejected by $M$; otherwise it is accepted and the induced run $\rho$ is well defined.

Our stateful specification $M^\sigma_F$ has the form $M^\sigma_F = (Q \times q^0 \times Q \times \Sigma, \delta^\sigma)$. The alphabet $\Sigma_C$ is the set of interpretations of the action predicates in $A$. Each state in $Q_\sigma$ is an assignment of values to each of the data structures introduced below in section 3.2. The initial state $q^0$ and the transition relation $\delta^\sigma$ are also presented in section 3.2.

Note that the only difference between $\Omega_C$ and $\Sigma_C$ is that elements of the former interpret the authorization predicate Authz, as well as the predicates in $A$. We call each $\sigma \in \Sigma_C$ an action sequence. An action sequence $\sigma$ can be obtained from a trace $\kappa$ by projecting each element of the trace, $\kappa_t$, onto the action predicates. In this case we write $\sigma = \kappa|A$. Because $\tau_0, \tau_1, \tau_2$ do not use Authz, $\kappa|A$ is well formed just in case $\kappa$ is well formed. As noted at the end of the previous section, for any $\kappa \in \Omega^*$ such that $\kappa \models \pi$, the interpretation of Authz at $\kappa_t$ is uniquely determined by the prefix of $\sigma = \kappa|A$ of length $i + 1$. Put another way, for each well formed action sequence $\sigma$, there is a unique $\kappa$ such that $\sigma = \kappa|A$ and $\kappa \models \pi$. The run of $M^\sigma_F$, $\rho$, induced by a given $\sigma \in \Sigma^\sigma$, maintains the data structures contained in each $\rho_t$, so that their values can be used to make authorization decisions without the need to consult $\sigma$. In section 4 we will show that (1) given any action sequence $\sigma$, there is a run of $M^\sigma_F$, $\rho$, induced by $\sigma$ if and only if $\sigma$ is well formed and (2) $\rho$ generates exactly the same authorization decisions as does the unique $\kappa$ such that $\sigma = \kappa|A$.

3.2 Data Structures and Invariants

This section presents the data structures used by $M^\sigma_F$. The design process we used was organized by simultaneously specifying invariants that characterize properties of the history up to any given point in $\sigma$ and relating those properties to values assumed by the data structures at that point. We knew we needed certain combinations of data structure values to indicate that either $\lambda_1$ or $\lambda_2$ was satisfied. We developed natural-seeming data structures for representing when this is the case, as well as corresponding invariants that together entailed $\lambda_1$ or $\lambda_2$. Table 2 summarizes the data structures of $M^\sigma_F$, each of the values they can take on, and the temporal invariants under which each of those values is assumed.

Boolean-valued data structures CurrUserMem($u$, $g$) and CurrObjMem($o$, $g$) represent, respectively, whether user $u$ and object $o$ are current members of group $g$. The structures Join_Type($u$, $g$), Leave_Type($u$, $g$), Add_Type($o$, $g$) and Remove_Type($o$, $g$) record that the most recent join, leave, add, and remove events for the respective users, objects and groups were strict or liberal. Their possible values are $L$, $S$, and NULL, representing respectively liberal, strict, and the case in which no such event has yet occurred.

Recall that when a user (resp., object) experiences a liberal leave (resp., remove), users continue to have access to the objects to which they had access prior to these events. We use PrevAuth($u$, $o$, $g$) to record whether $u$ was authorized for $o$ via $g$ at the time the most recent liberal leave and/or liberal remove occurred. (This is needed to handle correctly the left-hand subformulas of each of $\lambda_1$ and $\lambda_2$.)

Recall that when an object is added prior to a user joining, if either of these actions is strict, the user does not gain access to the object. To make authorization decisions correctly in this case, the stateful specification uses timestamps (not shown in Table 2—see use in definition of Authz_DS, section 3.3); the structures Join_Timestamp($u$, $o$, $g$) and Add_Timestamp($o$, $g$) record timestamps associated with the most recent join of $u$ and add of $o$, respectively. For simplicity, we assume here that timestamps are simply natural numbers with 0 representing that the event has not occurred, and with other values increasing monotonically with time (e.g., the current index in the action sequence). Thus, the case in which the object add precedes the user join can be identified simply by comparing the associated timestamp values. This is the mechanism used in the authorization decisions made by the stateful specification, presented in the next section.

Timestaps are a natural solution in an implementation because their values can be established in a distributed, decentralized manner. However, they are not conducive to verification via model checking because, theoretically, they grow without bound as the system runs. Model checking can be applied directly only to finite state machines. To overcome this, we use a standard technique called abstraction [5] wherein the unbounded structure is replaced by a bounded one that contains only the information that is essential to the state machine. Specifically, we introduce a structure JoinTimestamp($u$, $o$, $g$), shown in Table 2, which takes on the value 1 when $u$ joined before or at the same time as $o$ was added. (If $u$ or $o$ has been a group member multiple times, the structure reflects the most recent join and add.) If the add occurred first, the value is 0. Three additional values represent the cases in which one or both of the actions have never occurred: NoJoin, NoAdd, and NULL, the latter indicating that neither has occurred. We use abstraction JoinTimestamp to verification (in model checking) purpose only.

For all $u \in U$, $o \in O$ and $g \in G$, for all well formed action sequence $\sigma \in \Sigma^\sigma$, and for all $i \in N$, letting $\rho$ be the run induced by $\sigma$, the invariants listed in Table 2 hold. Note that each of the invariants has been verified by using model checking. As we discuss further in section 4, because the formulas being model checked refer to group operations involving only one user and/or object and group, it is sufficient to check that the formulas hold for very small carriers containing only one element each. This enables us to convert the formulas to propositional form, making them amenable to model checking. The invariants also assist in designing the transition relations that we will introduce in section 3.4.

3.3 Stateful Specification of Authorization

In this section, we show how authorization decisions are made based on the data structures we introduced in the previous section. We denote the function that yields these authorization decisions by Authz_DS, which is defined as follows. (Because Authz_DS is not itself a data structure, in the following, $\rho_t$ can be viewed as a parameter to the function, much as when a method is invoked on an object in object oriented programming.) For all $u \in U$, $o \in O$
Table 2: Data Structures, Values, and Invariants. Boolean value “true” is represented by 1, “false”, by 0

\[\rho, \text{CurrUserMem}(u, g) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SJ(u, g) \lor LJ(u, g)) \\
0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \text{CurrObjMem}(o, g) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } \sigma, i, [o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SR(o, g) \lor LR(o, g)) \\
0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \text{Join_Type}(u, g) = \begin{cases} L \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SJ(u, g) \land SJ(u, g)) \\
S \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(LJ(u, g) \land SJ(u, g)) \\
\text{NULL} \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SJ(u, g) \land LJ(u, g)) \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \text{Leave_Type}(u, g) = \begin{cases} L \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SJ(u, g) \land LL(u, g)) \\
S \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(LJ(u, g) \land LL(u, g)) \\
\text{NULL} \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(LJ(u, g) \land LL(u, g)) \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \text{Add_Type}(o, g) = \begin{cases} L \text{ if } \sigma, i, [o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SA(o, g) \land LA(o, g)) \\
S \text{ if } \sigma, i, [o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(LA(o, g) \land SA(o, g)) \\
\text{NULL} \text{ if } \sigma, i, [o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(LA(o, g) \land SA(o, g)) \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \text{Remove_Type}(o, g) = \begin{cases} L \text{ if } \sigma, i, [o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SR(o, g) \land LR(o, g)) \\
S \text{ if } \sigma, i, [o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(LR(o, g) \land SR(o, g)) \\
\text{NULL} \text{ if } \sigma, i, [o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(LR(o, g) \land SR(o, g)) \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \text{PrevAuthz}(u, o, g) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } \sigma, i, [u \rightarrow u, o \rightarrow o, g \rightarrow g] \models \neg(SJ(u, g) \lor LL(u, g)) \land \\
\neg(LJ(u, g) \lor LJ(u, g)) \land \\
\neg((SA(o, g) \lor LA(o, g)) \land (SJ(u, g) \lor LJ(u, g)) \\
\neg(SJ(u, g) \lor LJ(u, g)) \land (SL(u, g) \lor SR(o, g)) \\
0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \phi_1(u, o, g) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } \rho, \text{Join_Type}(u, g) = L \\
\land \rho, \text{Join_TLE_AdjT}(u, o, g) = L \\
\land ((\rho, \text{Join_TS}(u, g) \leq \rho, \text{Add_TS}(o, g))), \\
\land \rho, \text{Join_TS}(u, g) \neq 0 \land (\rho, \text{Add_TS}(o, g) = 0) \\
\land (\rho, \text{PrevAuthz}(u, o, g) = 1) \\
\land (\rho, \text{Join_TS}(u, g) > \rho, \text{Add_TS}(o, g)) \\
0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \phi_2(u, o, g) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } (\rho, \text{CurrUserMem}(u, g) = 1) \lor \\
(\rho, \text{Leave_Type}(u, g) = L) \\
\land \rho, \text{PrevAuthz}(u, o, g) = 1 \\
0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \]

\[\rho, \phi_3(u, o, g) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } (\rho, \text{CurrObjMem}(o, g) = 1) \lor \\
(\rho, \text{Remove_Type}(o, g) = L) \\
\land \rho, \text{PrevAuthz}(u, o, g) = 1 \\
0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \]

Let us summarize the intuition behind \(\phi_1, \phi_2, \text{ and } \phi_3\), each of which must be true for \(u\) to have access to \(o\) via \(g\). Formula \(\phi_1\) ignores the question of whether \(u\) and \(o\) are currently members of \(g\); that issue is handled by \(\phi_2\) and \(\phi_3\). Formula \(\phi_1\) is true if any of the following three cases hold: the most recent join and add were both liberal; \(u\)}
joined before or at the same time as o was added; u joined after o was added, but the last time they were both in g, u had access to o. Formula $\phi_2$ requires that u is currently a member of g unless u's the most recent leave was liberal and u had access o immediately prior to leaving. Formula $\phi_3$ states for o the same requirement that $\phi_2$ states for u.

Note that neither $\phi_2$ nor $\phi_3$ depends on the most recent join or add type because the $\pi$ specification uses what is called lossless versions of join and add [13]. This means that when u joins g or o is added to g, this never causes u to lose access o if u had access immediately prior to the join or add operations. This intuition is stated formally in the $\pi$ specification. So if u to had access to o via g prior to the join (respectively, add), then the access will be retained at least until the subsequent leave (respectively, remove—whichever comes first).

3.4 Transition Relations

We present transition relations of data structures used by $M_2$. To illustrate, here we show initial states and transition relations of four data structures: CurrUserMem, Join_Type, Leave_Type and PrevAuthz.

For all $u \in U$ and $g \in G$, the initial value of CurrUserMem($u, g$) is assigned as 0, as we assume that when the system starts, no user is in any group. To express the state transition relation, we use the convention that values of structures in the destination state are denoted by adding primes to the structure names; unprimed names refer to the structures’ values in the source state. The state transition relation for CurrUserMem is given by following.

$((\text{CurrUserMem}(u,g) = 1) \land (\text{SL'}(u,g) \lor \text{LL'}(u,g))) \land$

$((\text{CurrUserMem}(u,g) = 0)) \lor$

$((\text{CurrUserMem}(u,g) = 0) \land (\text{SJ'}(u,g) \lor \text{LJ'}(u,g))) \land$

$(\text{CurrUserMem}(u,g) = 1)) \lor$

$((\text{CurrUserMem}(u,g) = 1)) \land$

Note that the formula defining the transition relation for CurrUserMem is false when a user attempts to leave a group to which he does not belong. This reflects the fact that there is no legal transition in this case and that the action sequence is rejected by $M_2$. This is appropriate because such an action sequence is not well formed.

For all $u \in U$ and $g \in G$, the initial value of Join_Type is NULL, as no join occurs in the initial state. The transition relation for Join_Type is given by following.

$(\text{LJ'}(u,g) \land \neg\text{SJ'}(u,g) \land (\text{Join_Type'}(u,g) = L)) \lor$

$(\text{SJ'}(u,g) \land \neg\text{LJ'}(u,g) \land (\text{Join_Type'}(u,g) = S)) \lor$

$((\text{Join_Type'}(u,g) = \text{Join_Type}(u,g)))$

Join_Type records the type of the most recent join. Whenever a join occurs, the value of Join_Type is updated to the most recent join type.

Similarly, for all $u \in U$ and $g \in G$, the initial value of Leave_Type is NULL, as no leave occurs in the initial state. We define the transition relation for Leave_Type as following.

$(\text{LL'}(u,g) \land \neg\text{SL'}(u,g) \land (\text{Leave_Type'}(u,g) = L)) \lor$

$(\text{SL'}(u,g) \land \neg\text{LL'}(u,g) \land (\text{Leave_Type'}(u,g) = S)) \lor$

$((\text{Leave_Type'}(u,g) = \text{Leave_Type}(u,g)))$

The transition relations for Add_Type and Remove_Type are defined in similar way.

For all $u \in U$, $o \in O$ and $g \in G$, the initial value of PrevAuthz($u, o, g$) is 0, as no action occurred in the past and previously $u$ is not authorized to access o. The state transition relation for PrevAuthz is given by following.

$((\text{Add_Type'}(u,g,o) \lor \text{Remove_Type'}(u,g,o)) \land (\text{Add_Type'}(u,g,o) = \text{Authz} \_ \text{DS}(u,o,g)))$

Recall that we use $\text{PrevAuthz}(u,o,g)$ to record whether $u$ was authorized for $o$ via $g$ at the time the most recent liberal leave and/or liberal remove took place. The $\text{PrevAuthz}(u,o,g)$ value in the destination state of transition relation depends on the $\text{Authz} \_ \text{DS}(u,o,g)$ value in the source state. As defined in 3.3, the $\text{Authz} \_ \text{DS}(u,o,g)$ value can be computed by values of all data structures on the source state.

3.5 Case Study

![Figure 1: Case Study](image)

In this section we present a case study to show how data structures are updated in stateful specification and how authorization is determined in a given point by using data structure values.

We assume that each user, object and group have their respective unique identifier in the system. Assume that we have a research group $G_1$. Although there may be many users and objects in $G_1$, in our case study, we only consider user Bob and object File1 in $G_1$.

In the initial state, the data structures are assigned values as following.

- CurrUserMem($Bob, G_1$) = 0,
- Join_Type($Bob, G_1$) = NULL,
- Leave_Type($Bob, G_1$) = NULL,
- Join_TS($Bob, G_1$) = 0,
- CurrObjMem($File1, G_1$) = 0,
- Add_Type($File1, G_1$) = NULL,
Remove_Type(File1, G1) = NULL,
Add_TS(File1, G1) = 0,
PrevAuthz(Bob, File1, G1) = 0.

As shown in figure 1, Bob joins G1 by SJ at timestamp 12. It causes the following data structures to be updated, and other data structures remain unchanged since initial assignment.

- CurrUserMem(Bob, G1) = 1,
- Join_Type(Bob, G1) = S,
- Join_TS(Bob, G1) = 12.

At timestamp 15, File1 is added to G1 by LA. It causes the following data structures to be updated, and other data structures remain unchanged.

- CurrObjMem(File1, G1) = 1,
- Add_Type(File1, G1) = L,
- Add_TS(File1, G1) = 15.

Bob leaves G1 by SL at timestamp 20, the following data structures are updated.

- CurrUserMem(Bob, G1) = 0,
- Leave_Type(Bob, G1) = S.

Note that according to transition relation of PrevAuthz, the value of PrevAuthz(Bob, File1, G1) will set to 0 when SL occurs. However, the value is the same as in previous state. So we did not list it above since we only listed the data structure values that are updated and different from the values in previous state.

Suppose we need to make a authorization decision for Bob to read File1 in G1 at this state (at timestamp 20). According to Authz_DS defined in section 3.3, the value is determined by the values of data structures at this state. We compute that Authz_DS(Bob, File1, G1) = 0. (As φ2 = 0.)

At timestamp 26, Bob rejoins G1 by LJ. The following data structures are updated as:

- CurrUserMem(Bob, G1) = 1,
- Join_Type(Bob, G1) = L,
- Join_TS(Bob, G1) = 26.

Note that the previous join at timestamp 12 is no longer relevant in determining authorization after Bob rejoins G1. These data structures only keep the updated value caused by the most recent join.

At timestamp 30, File1 is removed from G1 by LR. The following data structures are updated.

- CurrObjMem(File1, G1) = 0,
- Remove_Type(File1, G1) = L,
- PrevAuthz(Bob, File1, G1) = 1.

Because an LR occurs, PrevAuthz needs to be updated. Note that the PrevAuthz is based on the value of Authz_DS in the previous state, that is, at timestamp 26. (Because no group action for Bob or File1 occurred and no data structure were updated since then.) In the previous state,

- Join_Type(Bob, G1) = L
- Add_Type(File1, G1) = L
- CurrUserMem(Bob, G1) = 1
- CurrObjMem(File1, G1) = 1

So we get Authz_DS(Bob, File1, G1) = 1. (All φ1, φ2 and φ3 have value 1.) According to the transition relation of PrevAuthz, PrevAuthz(Bob, File1, G1) is updated to 1 based on Authz_DS value in the previous state.

Consider we need to make a authorization decision for Bob to read File1 in G1 at timestamp 35. The Authz_DS(Bob, File1, G1) is determined by the values of data structures at this state. Because no group action for Bob or File1 ever occurred since timestamp 30, all data structure value remain unchanged since then. Because Remove_Type(File1, G1) = L and PrevAuthz(Bob, File1, G1) = 1, the Authz_DS gets the value 1. (All φ1, φ2 and φ3 have value 1.)

The PrevAuthz records authorization decision at the time the most recent leave or remove occurs. Whenever authorization decision is to be made, we do not need to refer to the entire event history. Instead, we use the! data structures that summarized the event history information to make an authorization decision.

In contrast, stateless specification contains no such data structures to provide summarized event history information, every action in the history need to be kept track of. And whenever a authorization decision is to be made, the entire trace need to be inspected. Since there may be only LR and LL in the group, and the overlapping membership period for user and object can be arbitrarily far in the past.

In the current design step, we assume that the timestamps are managed by a global clock. Clock synchronization and latency issues will be addressed in later steps of development process, but not in this paper.

It must be acknowledged that while all other data structures support distributed implementation, PrevAuthz(u, o, g) does not. Owing to our desire to support distributed implementation in later stages of the specification refinement process, this constitutes an open problem we still face. Section 6 discusses our thoughts on how we hope to address it in future work.

4. THE REFINEMENT EQUIVALENCE OF STATELESS AND STATEFUL POLICY

The correctness requirements of the stateful specification $M^s_s$ are (1) that for all action sequence $σ ∈ S^*$, $M^s_s$ accepts $σ$ if and only if $σ$ is well formed and (2) the stateless Authz and the stateful Authz_DS agree at each step i. We refer to the “only if” part of (1) together with (2) as soundness. We refer to the “if” part of (1) as completeness.

We introduce a distinguished collection of small carriers, $C_{sm} = (G_{sm}, U_{sm}, O_{sm})$, in which each carrier contains exactly one element. For the small carrier case, $C_{sm}$, we can use model checking to verify part of (1) and all of (2). NuSMV [3] is an open source symbolic model checking [4] tool. We
choose to use NuSMV because it supports past temporal operators and it is optimized to handle a large number of states. NuSMV takes as a finite state machine (FSM) and exhaustively explores all its executions to determine whether a set of properties specified in temporal logic holds. As we shall see, these results can be generalized easily to the large carrier case because the authorization of a user for an object in a given group is independent of actions taken by other users or with other objects and groups. We further use model checking to verify the invariants on the data structures.

Model checking verifies that all runs of the given FSM satisfy the given property, however it is not possible to show that all runs that have the property are generated by the FSM. Thus we cannot show completeness by using model checking. We show completeness by using manual proof techniques instead. This manual proof makes use of the invariants on the data structures.

4.1 Soundness

**Lemma 4.1** *(Small-Carrier Soundness).* Let $U_{sm} = \{u\}$, $O_{sm} = \{o\}$, $G_{sm} = \{g\}$, and $C_{sm} = (U_{sm}, O_{sm}, G_{sm})$. For all traces $\tau \in \Omega_{sm}$, if a run $\rho$ of $M_{sm}$ is induced by $\pi$, then (1) $\rho$ is well formed and (2) if $\rho = \{\pi\}$, then for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$, $\langle u, o, g \rangle \in [\text{Authz}]\pi$, if and only if $\rho_i.\text{Authz}_{DS}(u, o, g)$.

We have verified Lemma 4.1 by using the NuSMV model checker. Doing so requires embedding the action sets in the machine states. A run of the machine we model checked had the form $\rho^{MC}$ in which for each $i \in \mathbb{N}$, $\rho_i^{MC} = (\rho_i, \kappa_i)$, $\kappa_0$ maps each predicate to the empty relation, and $\rho = \{\rho_1\}$, and $\kappa = \{\kappa_1\}$, satisfy the requirements of Lemma 4.1.

**Theorem 4.2** *(Soundness for Arbitrary Carriers).* Given an arbitrary collection of countable carriers $C = (G, U, O)$, for all traces $\tau \in \Omega^\omega_C$, if a run $\rho$ of $M^\omega_C$ is induced by $\pi$, then (1) $\rho$ is well formed and (2) if $\tau = \{\pi\}$, then for all $\rho_i^{MC}$, $\rho_i^{MC} = \{\rho_i \circ \pi, \kappa_i\}$, $\kappa_0$ maps each predicate to the empty relation, and $\rho = \{\rho_1\}$, and $\kappa = \{\kappa_1\}$, satisfy the requirements of Lemma 4.1.

**Proof Sketch.** The lemma generalizes to large carriers for two reasons. First, by inspecting the formula, in the $\pi$ specification, Authz($u, o, g$) depends only on group operations involving these individuals. Second, the transition relations for each data structure in $M_C$ refers to only one user and/or object and to one group, both with respect to the data structure indices and with respect to the group operations. It follows from these observations that in both the stateless and the stateful specification the authorization of a given user for a given object via a given group is independent of group operations involving any other users, objects, or groups. Hence, the size of the carriers is immaterial to the validity of the proof.

4.2 Completeness

For completeness proof, we need to show that every trace that satisfies the stateless specification can be generated by the SM. From theorem 4.2, we know that every time the stateless specification confirms Authz, the stateful specification also confirms Authz$_{DS}$, and vice versa. So for completeness, we need only show that a run of a trace that satisfies the well formed constraints is accepted by the SM.

**Lemma 4.3** *(Correctness of Invariants).* For a system with carriers $C = (G, U, O)$, the invariants of all data structures are all satisfied.

**Proof.** We have model checked the invariants with respect to the small carriers, $C_{sm}$.

These results extend to the countably infinite carrier case because the values of the portions of the data structures indexed by given users, objects, and groups depend only on actions that involve those users, objects, and groups. For instance, the value of CurrObjMem($u, g$) depends only on the adds and removes done on object $o$ in group $g$, and not on actions involving any other object, group, or user.

**Theorem 4.4** *(Completeness).* For a system with carriers $C = (G, U, O)$, any well formed action sequence $\sigma \in \Sigma^\omega_C$ induces a run $\rho$ of $\sigma \in Q^\omega_C \times \Sigma^\omega_C$ inductively on the length of the third argument. If $\sigma \in \Sigma^\omega_C$ is the empty sequence, then for all $\rho \in Q^\omega_C$, $\delta_\rho(q, q, \varepsilon)$ holds. For $j > 0$, $\delta_\rho(q, q, \sigma[1:j])$ holds if there exists $\rho \in Q^\omega_C$ such that $\delta_\rho(q, q, \sigma[1:j])$ holds. By the construction of our SM, no action occurs in the initial state. So we have the base case that for $\sigma_0 = \varepsilon$, and $\delta_\rho(q, q, \varepsilon)$ holds.

We complete our proof based on the base case, and the induction hypothesis that for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$ and $j > 0$, and for all well formed action sequence $\sigma$, there exists $\rho \in Q^\omega_C$ such that $\delta_\rho(q, q, \sigma[1:j])$. We need to prove that for all possible $\sigma_j$ that satisfies well form constraints, there exists a transition relation $\delta_\rho(q, q, \sigma_j)$. To satisfy the well formed requirement $\sigma_0 \wedge \sigma_1$, for all $u \in U$, $g \in G$, and for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\sigma \in \Sigma^\omega_C$. Each $(u, g)$ occurs in at most one of the following actions in a given state: LJ, SL, LJ, LL, SL. And for all $g \in G$, $g \in G$, and for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\sigma \in \Sigma^\omega_C$. Each $(o, g)$ occurs in at most one of the following actions in a given state: LA, SA, LR, SR. The proof needs to show that for all possible action sequences that also satisfy $\sigma_2$, there will be a state transition based on the induction hypothesis. Among all possible actions that may occur at $j$ of $\sigma \in \Sigma^\omega_C$, we only show one case study as an example. All other cases could be proved in similar way. In our example, at $j$ of $\sigma \in \Sigma^\omega_C$, a user $u \in U$ liberal join group $g \in G$, and no other action occurs at the same time. That is, $(u, g) \in [SL]_\sigma$. By the $\tau_2$ we know that for all $u \in U$ and $g \in G$:

So we get

$\sigma \rightarrow [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] = \neg(LJ(u, g) \wedge LL(u, g)) \wedge (SL(u, g) \wedge LJ(u, g))$

By the induction hypothesis that we have $\delta_\rho(q_0, q, \sigma[1:j])$. And by the invariant of CurrUserMem($u, g$) listed in table 2,
for all \( u \in \mathcal{U} \) and \( g \in \mathcal{G} \), for all \( \rho_i \in Q_\ast \), for all \( \sigma \in 2^\Sigma \) and for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\rho_i \cdot \text{CurrUserMem}(u, g) = 1 \iff \sigma, i \cdot [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \\
\neg (SL(u, g) \lor LL(u, g)) \lor (SJ(u, g) \lor LJ(u, g))
\]

So in our example, in the state \( q \),

\[
q \cdot \text{CurrUserMem}(u, g) = 1 \iff \sigma, j - 1 \cdot [u \rightarrow u, g \rightarrow g] \models \\
\neg (SL(u, g) \land LL(u, g)) \lor (SJ(u, g) \land LJ(u, g))
\]

That is, in state \( q \), \( \text{CurrUserMem}(u, g) = 1 \). By the state transition relation in 3.4, we have

\[
((\text{CurrUserMem}(u, g) = 1 \land (LL'(u, g) \lor SL'(u, g))) \\
\land (\text{CurrUserMem}'(u, g) = 0))
\]

So there will be a transition from \( q \) to \( q' \). And in the new state \( q' \), \( \text{CurrUserMem}(u, g) = 0 \).

\[\square\]

5. REFINING THE SPECIFICATION TO HANDLE ACTION REQUESTS

The action sequence provided as input to a given run of \( M_\pi^g \) is provided by the environment in which \( M_\pi^g \) is deployed. An implementation of an AC system cannot reject an ill-formed action sequence, as halting the system is unacceptable. In this section, we discuss informally an aspect of the stateful specification that refines the \( \pi \) specification, namely the treatment of group-operation requests. The stateful specification augments \( M_\pi^g \) with an input/output SM that acts as a transducer, converting an input action-request sequence into a well formed action sequence, which is then provided as input to \( M_\pi^g \).

Ensuring that the output of the filter SM is a legal action sequence is straightforward. (As part of our work with the model checking, we generated a filter SM and verified that it satisfies this requirement. For this purpose, our model-checking code nondeterministically generates arbitrary request sequences.) Slightly more interesting is the problem of ensuring that for each legal action sequence, there exists a request sequence that causes the filter SM to generate the given action sequence. This can be ensured by requiring that when presented with a set of requests that, taken together, are all legal, the filter SM does not drop any of them. Together, these two requirements are sufficient in the sense that the action sequences that can be generated by the filter SM are exactly the well formed action sequences. However, these requirements do not uniquely specify the filter SM. Consider the case in which a single user requests to perform both a liberal and a strict join on the same group at the same time. The simplest behavior in this case is to drop both requests. However other options exist: ask the user which one to perform; apply a predefined policy that selects between the two; or flip a coin and drop one on that basis.

6. LIMITATIONS OF SCALABILITY

The principal limitation of our stateful specification concerns PrevAuthz. First, the structure is inherently centralized, as information is kept in it for each \( (u, o, g) \) tuple. Second, each time a user operation is performed on a group \( g \), the value of the structure must be updated for all tuples involving that user and group (i.e., one update per object) and similarly for each object operation. There are environmental conditions in which these limitations may not be a major problem, namely when the system is not highly distributed and/or the rate of authorization queries greatly exceeds the rate of group operations. In particular, PrevAuthz enables authorization queries to be answered in constant time. Nevertheless, a less centralized approach would often be desirable. A natural alternative would be use timestamps to maintain with each user and object the history of group operations in which it participates. Authorization of a user for an object could then be decided by comparing the histories of each. The problem with this approach is that in general, the overlapping membership periods for the user and object can be arbitrarily far in the past (when no SL or SR has been performed). Thus the local histories can grow without bound, as can the time required to make authorization decisions.

In future work, we would like to develop a hybrid approach. The idea is that local histories are maintained. However, in the background, users and objects periodically transmit these to a centralized controller. There, a structure much like our PrevAuthz is constructed, though it summarizes histories up to some point in the past. Appropriate portions of this structure are then pushed out to users and objects, which are then able to truncate their local histories at the point in the past summarized by the structure. The authorization decision procedure compares the local histories of user and object, and if a decision is not reached prior to the truncation point, the summary structure is then used.

7. RELATED WORK

Many notable research efforts have been aimed at leveraging formal methods in building trustworthy computing systems, including defining security policies in temporal logic, designing formal models of program monitors to enforce software security and privacy, and reasoning about high-level security and specifications using model checking. Temporal logic is suitable to specify policies concerning behaviors (e.g., policies regulating how principals to transmit messages and to use private data in certain temporal order). Model checking, has been proven as a more effective means of analyzing temporal logic specifications than certain other computationally intensive types of analysis, providing security practitioners a way of analyzing policies with automated tools. Many research efforts have been made towards developing security systems by leveraging formal methods. Recently, model checking has been increasingly employed to reason about security properties specified in temporal logic, Role-Based Access Control Models (RBAC) and trust management systems. Schaad et al. [17] verified separation of duty properties in RBAC systems using NuSMV. Hansen et al. [8] utilized SPIN to verify various static and dynamic separation of duty properties in RBAC. Other work [6, 7, 9, 19] also supports the use of formal tools to verify properties of security policies.

Barth et al. [2] introduce a formal framework that uses FOTL for specifying privacy policies. FOTL specification of security and privacy systems can exhibit a high-level of complexity, leading to difficulty in the assessment admission of system behavior and in the development of enforcement. Our research develops a combination of methods to reason
about FOTL specification, the one notable technique that is closely related to our work is the development of small model theorem [16] in the verification of parameterized systems. The small model theorem states that if a parameterized system of a small, finite size of processes satisfies a property then any such system with an arbitrary number of processes also models the temporal logic property. This allows us to reduce the problem to the verification of a finite-state system, which can then be verified automatically using model checking [20].

Stepwise refinement techniques have been used in the design of security system to improve the correctness of such system. As shown in Sprenger et al. [18], the refinement could help designer to reason abstractly about the problem and extract its essential features, and to master the complexity of both models and proofs by focusing on individual design aspects at each step. Some notable work has contributed to the refinement of logic-based specification. Alur et al. develop a framework of secrecy and preservation of secrecy for labeled transition systems via refinement [1]. Pnueli’s work [15] shows that temporal logic can be used for presenting the requirement specification, which lists properties, and fair transition system can be used for presenting system specification, which describes abstract implementation. Their work also demonstrates the use of temporal logic for system refinement. Their work did present how to use fair transition system to refine PLTL specification, however, it is unclear how to extend the approach to refine FOTL specification. Our work adopt SM-based model to refine FOTL specification, so that it could be more intuitive to programmers who implement the security system.

8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented a stateful g-SIS specification that is a refinement of the prior stateless $\pi$ specification [13]. Our stateful specification is given by a state machine, $M^\pi_C$. As we have shown by using a combination of model checking and manual proofs, it makes authorization decisions identical to those made by the $\pi$ specification. However, it makes these decisions by inspecting data structures maintained by $M^\pi_C$ that summarize salient aspects of the action-sequence history. Additionally, our stateful specification incorporates an action-request filter, not found in the $\pi$ specification. Together, these steps bring us a significant step closer to our ultimate goal of constructing a specification that can be implemented by a security non-expert. Our approach illustrates how formal methods techniques can be applied in access control system.

In addition to pursuing the scalability ideas discussed in section 6, we plan to address problems that arise in handling communication and latency. Future work will additionally extend our design to support read-write stateful specification, in which object editing and updating is tracked by versioning, as well as relationships between groups that influence authorizations, group memberships, and information flows.

9. REFERENCES


